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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondant
vs.
ROBERT MAXSON VICKERS,

CASE NO. 14300

Defendant-Appellant

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case of first impression involving a
comparison as to

the meaning and possible overlap of two

statutes in the new criminal code.

This appeal is from a

conviction, judgement and sentence for the crime of Placing
of an Infernal Machine in violation of section 76-10-307
U.C.A. 1953 (as amended).

The issue raised by Appellant is

that he should have been convicted and sentenced for the crime
of Arson by means of explosives in violation of section 766-102.
DISPOSTION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by jury before the Honorable J. Harlan
Burns, Judge of the Fifth Judicial Court, and convicted and
sentenced for Placing of an Infernal Machine"in violation of
section 76-10-307 U.C.A. 1953 (as amended).
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Appellant argued throughout his trial that he could only
properly be convicted of and sentenced for the crime of Arson
by means of explosives.

This argument was raised in the form

of motions for a dismissal and directed verdict; requested
jury instructions on the offense of Arson and the definition
of Infernal Machine; objections to the jury instruction
used by the trial court in defining Infernal Machine; and a
motion at the time of judgement and sentencing wherein Appellant
requested that he be sentenced in accordance with the penalty
provisions

for the crime of Arson.

This appeal is from the rulings of the trial court in
denying all of Appellant's motions and requests concerning the
argument that Appellant was guilty of

the crime of Arson by

means of explosives rather than the crime of Placing of an
Infernal Machine.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and sentence
and respectfully requests that this court remand this case for
resentencing as a class A misdemeanor.

In the alternative,

Appellant seeks a new trial wherein the jury would be instructed
on the crime of Arson by means of explosives.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Shortly after 2:00 a.m. on March 13, 1975, in Washington,
Utah, the back end of a car belonging to Phillip Hartley was
blown up (T. 21). Shortly thereafter Appellant was found in
the back yard of the Hartley residence.
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Appellant had taken some dynamite and placed it at the
back bumper of the Hartley car (T.108).

After lighting it,

he left the scene, but realized what he had done and returned
to undo what he had started (T.108,9).

The time between lighting

the charge and returning to the car was established by Appellant
at four to ten minutes (T. 118) , and as he grabbed the dynamite
it exploded (T. 108,9).

As is common practice in detonating

dynamite, Appellant had used a blasting cap and fuse (T. 113).
The car was damaged in the amount of $975.00 (T. 28).
Appellant testified he just wanted to cause damage to the car
(T. 108. 118), but some circumstantial damage did occur.
Some plaster boards and nails in the house had been jarred
about a quarter inch by the concussion and the front porch roof
was loosened (T. 22,23 ) . There was also damage to grass and
bushes and doors on a shed (T. 23). This other damage amounted
to $415.00 (T. 28,29).

The damage to the shed doors appears to

have occured by Appellant running into the shed after the
explosion (T. 24).

-3-
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S
MOTIONS FOR DISMISSAL AND DIRECTED VERDICT BASED ON
THE FACT THE EVIDENCE SHOWED A VIOLATION OF THE CRIME
OF ARSON RATHER THAN THE CRIME OF PLACING OF AN
INFERNAL MACHINE.
This is a case of first impression.

Appellant admits

that he is guilty of damaging property of another by means of
explosives.

The central issue on appeal is which of two

statutes Appellant should have been convicted and sentenced
under.
Appellant claims he should have been convicted arid
sentenced under Section 76-6-102 Utah Code Annotated (1953
as amended), which provides;
A person is guilty of arson if, under circumstances
not amounting to aggravated arson, by means of fire
or
explosives, he unlawfully and intentionally damages:
(a) Any property with intention of defrauding
an insurer; or
(b) The property of another.
(2) A violation of subsection (a) is a felony
of the third degree. A violation of subsection (b)
is a felony of the third degree if the damage caused
exceeds $5,000 value; and Class A misdemeanor if the
damage exceeds $1,000 but is not more than $5,000
value; a Class B misdemeanor if the damage caused
exceeds $250 but is not more than $1,000; any other
violation is a Class C misdemeanor.
(Emphasis Added)
The section under which Appellant was charged, convicted,
and sentenced, 76-10-307, provides:
Every person who delivers or causes to be delivered
to any express or railway company or other common
carrier, or to any person, any infernal machine,
knowing it to be such, without informing the common
carrier or person of the nature thereof, or sends it
through the m a i l , or throws or places it on or about
the premises or property of another, or in any place
where another may be injured thereby in his person
or property, is guilty of a felony of the second
degree.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Section 76-10-306 defines infernal machine as follows:
An infernarl machine is any box, package, contrivance,
bomb, or apparatus containing or arranged with an
explosive or acid or poisonous or inflamable substance,
chemical, or compound, or knife, loaded pistol, or
gun, or other dangerous or harmful weapon or thing,
constructed, contrived, or arranged so as to explode,
ignite, or throw forth its contents, or to strike with
any of its parts, unexpectedly when moved, handled,
or operned, or after the lapse of time or under
conditions or in a manner calculated to endanger
health, life, limb, or property.
At the close of the State's case Appellant moved for a
dismissal of the charge of Placing of an Infernal Machine as
alleged in the Information (T.105).

A similar motion was

made for a directed verdict after both parties had rested
(T.120,1).

These motion were again presented after the jury

had retired and were again denied (T. 133,4).

Both motions

were based upon a showing from the evidence that the State
had failed to prove the existance of an Infernal Machine and
the case could only properly be submitted to the jury on a
theory of Arson by means of explosives.

For the reasons stated

below, the trial court erred in not granting Appellant's
motions.
The evidence produced by the estate showed that Appellant
had damaged the property of another by means of dynamite and
the Appellant had some blasting caps and fuse stored where
he lived.

During Appellant's own testimony it was established

that he had in fact used a blasting cap and fuse to detonate
the

dynamite.

This evidence places the actions of Appellant

squarely within the statute governing Arson.
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The Infernal Machine violation is obviously contemplated
to involve something other than the simple use of the type
of explosives exemplified in the instant case.

The conduct

of Appellant clearly constitute damage to proerpty" . . .

by

means of fire or explosives . . . " under the Arson statute,
but can hardly be said to involve a " . . . box, package, contrivance, bomb, or apparatus containing or arranged with an
explosive • . . " a s required by the section 76-10-306 definition
of Infernal Machine.
Any explosive material requires that something be done
to it or added to it to make it explode.

If dynamite with a

blasting cap and fuse is construed as a matter of law
as meeting the definition of Infernal Machine, it is difficult
for one to imagine what the legislature had in mind when it
included the use of explosives in the Arson statute.
In overruling Appellant's motion for a dismissal and
directed verdict, the trial court necessarily ruled that the
simple use of dynamite with a blasting cap and fuse constitutes
an Infernal Machine.

If this is so, then by enacting the new

criminal code the legislature passed overlaping statutes
with incongruous penalty provisions.
Arson requires actual damage and provides for a range
of punishments between a Class C misdemeanor and a third degree
-6-
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felony depending on the actual loss of value.

The crime of

placing of an Infernal Machine does not require any actual
loss and is punished as a second degree felony.

Under the

statutory construction used by the trial court in denying
Appellant's motions, a person who only attempted to commit
a Class C misdemeanor Arson would necessarily have also
committed a second degree felony Placing of an Infernal
Machine.

Such a result could not logically have been intended

by the legislature.
To reconcile the crime of Arson by means of explosives
with the crime of Placing of an Infernal Machine, it is
logical to interpret the definition of Infernal Machine
as encompassing a concept such as that of a time bomb or
booby trap which is more intricate than the simple use of
explosives.

This interpretation embodies the notion of moving

mechanical parts and is more consistant with the ordinary
meaning of the word machine.

Under such an interpretation

there would be no conflict between the statutes governing
Arson and Infernal Machine.

The definition of Arson would

be met where, as in the instant case, a defendantfs conduct
was limited to destruction of property by use of a simple
explosive means; and the definition of Infdrnal Machine would
be met if, for example, a defendant rigged dynamite to a car
in such an arrangement that starting the car would cause an
explosion.

wSuch a statutory construction would also be

consistant with the existance of a " . . . box, package,
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contrivance, bomb, or apparatus containing or arranged with
an explosive. . . "
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT'S
JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE OFFENSE OF ARSON,
DENYING APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON
DEFINITION OF INFERNAL MACHINE, AND IN OVERRULING
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE INCOMPLETE DEFINITION
OF INFERNAL MACHINE USED BY THE COURT IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY.
Appellant's requested jury instruction number 3 (R.48)
is a definition of Infernal Machine taken directly from the
statutory definition found in Section 76-10-306 and reads
as follows:
An infernal machine is defined as follows:
Any box, package, contrivance, bomb, or apparatus
containing or arranged with an explosive or acid
or poisonous or inflamable substance, chemical
or compound, or knife, loaded pistol, or gun, or cither
dangerous or harmful weapon or thing, constructed,
contrived, or arranged so as to explode, ignite,
or throw forth its contents, or to strike with any
of its parts, unexpectedly when moved, handled, or opened,
or after the lapse of time or under conditions or in a
manner calculated to endanger health, life, limb, or property.
Appellant's requested jury instruction number 4 (R. 49)
reads as follows:
If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the State
has established each and every element necessary to
convict the defendant of the crime of Delivery of an
Infernal Machine, you should next consider whether the
defendant is guilty of the crime of arson.
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Appellant's requested jury instruction number 5 (R.50)
provides the statutory elements necessary to find the defendant
guilty of arson and reads as follows:
To warrant you in finding the defendant guilty of
the Crime of Arson, you must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant:
(1) Intentionally damaged the property of another;
(2) That said damage was done by use of fire or
explosives; and
(3) That said acts occured in Washington County,
State of Utah.
Appellant objected to the Trial Court's refusal to give
these instructions (T.128), and the definition of infernal
machine in Instruction Number 15 (R. 62) as given by 1he court
was also objected to by Appellant (T. 123, 124).

Instruction

Number 15 as given reads as follows:
You are
instructed that an infernal machine is
any package, contrivance, bomb or apparatus containing
or arranged with an explosive constructed, contrived
or arranged so as to explode after the lapse of time
or in a manner calculated to endanger property.
As noted in Appellant's exception to Instruction Number
15, Appellant's "entire defense is based on the definition of
infernal machine1' (T

] 23)i( and Appellant was denied the

opportunity to have the jury determine the meaning of that
term since it did not have the entire definition.
The impact of the Trial Court's refusal to give the
complete statutory definition of infernal machine was substantially
aggravated by the Court's refusal to grant AppelIaiit's requested
instruction on Arson.

The effect of this procedure by
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the Trial Court was to rule that Appellant's actions constituted
delivery of an Infernal Machine and did not, as a matter of lav/
constitute arson.

In refusing to give Appellant's requested

instructions 4 and 5 (R. 49,50) regarding the crime of arson,
Appellant was denied the right to have the jury consider Arson
as a possible alternative to finding Appellant guilty of
placing in Infernal Machine.
Under the rulings of the trial court on the above
noted jury instructions, it appears to be impossible for one
to commit the crime of Arson by use of explosives.

The intent

of legislature is passing section 76-6-102 on Arson contemplates
no such premis.

The offense which the legislature contemplated

when providing for Arson by means of explosives has been
eliminated by judicial fiat under the rulings by the trial
court.

Such a result is in direct disregard for the manifest

intent of the legislature to create two separate and distinct
crimes.
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS AND
• DUE PROCESS BECAUSE HE WAS NOT GIVEN THE BENEFIT
OF RECEIVING THE LESSER OF TWO POSSIBLE STATUTORY
PUNISHMENTS FOR THE SAME ACT.
It cannot be questioned that Appellant's act constituted
the crime of Arson as

provided in Section 76-6-102.

If such an

act is also construed as Placing an Infernal Machine as provided
in Section 7 6-10-307 then the legislature has made the same
act subject to two different sanctions and Appellant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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s!ioiild have been sentenced under the lesser penalty.
At the time of sentencing, Appellant argued as a
cause against judgement that under the Utah Supreme Court
cases of State v. Fair, 23 1 Jtal i 2(1 34, 456 p. 2d,

ll

and State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 4 53 P. 2d. 14*.

'° (1969)
,-^ N

Appellant

should be sentenced to the punishment provided for a Class
A misdemeanor under the arson statute since the value of
the property damage was less than $5,000.
was denied.

(Sentencing Transcript ;

This motion

,4)

In the cases of Fair, and Shondel., this court held that
an accused should be accountable for only the lesser of two
conflicting penalties where the same act has been made the
subject of two legislative fiats.

In reaching the decision

in Shondel, the opinion of this court relied upon principles
of equal protection of law in agreeing

fl

with the proposition

. . . that the equal protection of the laws requires that they
affect alike all persons similarly situated.
at 345, 453 P. 2d at 147.
principle that "

:2 Utah;

:

Reliance was also placed on the

. a penal statute should be . . . clear,

specific and understandable as to the penalty imposed for its
violation."

22 Utah 2d at 346, 453 P.2d at 248.

Both of these principles of Shondel were violated by
the compound effect in denying Appellant the opportunity to have
the jury consider Arson and then denying Appellant1s motion

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
-11-

to be setenced under the Arson statute as the lesser of two
possible penalties.
If one were to decide to commit the crime of Arson by
means of explosives and be willing to suffer the consequences
established by the legislature, it would be impossible to do
so under the rulings made by the trial court.

Such a result is

clearly inconsistant with the words of Chief Justice Crockett
that " . . .

a penal statute should be . . . clear, specific

and understandable as to the penalty imposed for its violation."
22 Utah 2d at 346, 453 P.2d at 148.
CONCLUSION
This case should be reversed and remanded for the reason
that the evidence adduced at trial proved only the crime of
Arson by means of explosives and does not support a finding
of guilty of Placing of an Infernal Machine.

The definition of

Infernal Machine requires a more intricate or mechanical means
than the simple use of dynamite employed by Appellant and the
trial court erred in not granting Appellant's motions for
dismissal and directed verdict.
The refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury
with respect to the crime of Arson by means of explosives denied
Appellant due process of law.

This error was compounded by

the refusal of the trial court to sentence Appellant in compliance
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with the principle stated in Shondel that " . . . where there
is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is
applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit
of the lesser."

22 Utah 2d at 346, 453 P.2d at 148.

Respectfully submitted,

RAYMOND S. SHUEY
Attorney for Appellant

-13-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY
SEP 16 1976
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

J. Reuben Clark Law School

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

